In this paper, we analyze the secrecy performance of the decode-and-forward (DF) relay system in generalized-K fading channels. In a typical four-node communications model, a source (S) sends confidential information to a destination (D) via a relay (R) using DF strategy in two time slots, while an eavesdropper (E) wants to overhear the information from S to D over generalized-K fading channels. To be more realistic, we assume that E can receive the signals of two time slots, and there is no direct link between S and D because of heavy fading. Based on those assumptions, we derive closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) by using a tight approximate probability density function of the generalized-K model. Furthermore, asymptotic expressions for the SOP and ESC are also derived in the high signal-to-noise ratio region, not only because we can get some insights about SOP and ESC, but also because expressions for SOP and ESC can be simplified significantly. The single relay system is subsequently extended into a multi-relay system, where the asymptotic SOP analysis of three proposed relay selection strategies is investigated. Moreover, the security-reliability tradeoff analysis in the multi-relay system is also presented given that S adopts a constant code rate. Finally, the Monte-Carlo simulation is used to demonstrate the accuracy of the derived closed-form expressions.
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I. INTRODUCTION

D UE to the open access property in wireless
communications, it is difficult to protect information from interception. This explains the reason that physical layer Manuscript security has recently received an increasing attention [1] - [3] .
In this context, [4] - [7] have investigated the secrecy performance over small-scale fading channels based on the foundation of [1] , including Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, and two-wave with diffuse power fading channels.
In the real communication scenarios, the large-scale fading should not be neglected, especially when the communications nodes move fast [8] . To capture both the small-scale and large-scale fading properties, some composite fading models have been proposed, where the generalized-K (GK) model has the high matching performance to the real fading in some communication scenarios [9] . In the GK model, the smallscale fading is modeled by the Nakagami-m distribution and the K distribution is used to approximate the Lognormal shadowing. Sequentially, [10] , [11] investigated the outage probability (OP) and ergodic capacity (EC) under different power adaptive methods based on the work [9] . The cooperative multi-hop relay system over GK fading channels was studied in [12] , and the corresponding closed-form expression for the asymptotic OP (AOP) was derived in the high signalto-noise ratio (SNR) region, which shows the diversity order and array gain. However, in the GK model parameter setting of k = m case, there was no asymptotic expression for the OP in [12] , limiting the application range of the AOP.
An issue of performance analysis in physical layer security over GK fading channels is that the exact probability density function (PDF) of GK fading is very complex, and typically leads to a Meijer's G-function in the final closed-form expression [13] , [14] , and there is a strong debate about whether the Meijer's G-function can be seen as a closed-form or not [15] . Therefore, a tight and tractably approximate PDF of GK fading was proposed in [16] , called the mixture Gamma distribution method, which is composed by only elementary functions. The corresponding gap between the approximate and exact PDF expressions converges with the number of summation terms in the approximate PDF increasing. This mixture Gamma distribution method for the GK fading approximation has been adopted in many secure analysis works, such as [17] - [20] .
The source-relay-destination is a common communication modality, especially when the destination is far away from the source. If eavesdroppers exist in this cooperative scenario, secure relay analysis is needed [21] - [23] . However, there are few works on the physical layer security by using relay strategy over GK fading channels. Although [24] investigated the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and ergodic secrecy 0090-6778 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
capacity (ESC) in the typical relay scenario, the authors in [24] only considered a single relay operating in the amplify-andforward (AF) strategy and derived approximate closed-form expressions for SOP and ESC in the high SNR region. Therefore, the analytical results derived from those approximate expressions will deviate significantly from the simulation results in the low SNR region, which can be obviously shown in Fig. 3 of [24] . As known to all, the relay operated in the decode-and-forward (DF) scheme, another common relay strategy, decodes the signals from the source before forwarding to the destination, rather than just amplifying the received signals in the AF case, leading to a better performance. To best of authors' knowledge, the secure analysis of DF strategy over GK fading channels has not been investigated. Moreover, the approximate expressions in [24] did not show the secrecy diversity order (SDO) and secrecy array gain (SAG) of the asymptotic SOP (ASOP), as well as the slope and power offset of the asymptotic ESC (AESC) in high SNRs, which are proposed by [5] - [7] . Actually, even for the typical three-node Wyner's model presented in [1] , there are very few works on asymptotic analysis for the SOP and ESC proposed by [5] - [7] in physical layer security over GK fading channels, which shows the SDO and SAG of SOP, and the slope and power offset of ESC in high SNRs. Although the ASOP in the typical three-node Wyner's model was investigated in [25] over GK fading channels, the expression for ASOP in [25] was not valid for m = k in the GK parameter setting, and the SDO proposed by [25] was not m for k < m, which will be proved in this paper.
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of DF relays over GK fading channels. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) In the single DF relay case, closed-form expressions for SOP and ESC are derived with very high accuracy by using an approximate PDF of the GK model proposed by [16] , [17] , where the Meijer's G-function is not involved, and the corresponding error between the approximate and exact results decreases with the number of summation terms in the approximate PDF increasing; 2) Due to the high complexity of the derived expressions for SOP and ESC in the single relay case, an asymptotic analysis is investigated in high SNRs to get some insights, where we derive ASOP and AESC, as well as AOP and asymptotic EC (AEC) of the source-relaydestination link. The asymptotic expressions for AOP and ASOP show that the diversity order is min{m, k}, rather than m proposed by [25] ; 3) Compared with [12] and [25] , the expressions for AOP and ASOP in the investigated single DF relay system are also derived when m = k in the GK parameter setting. From the expressions for AOP and ASOP, we find that the diversity order is m (or k) in the m = k case, although AOP and ASOP are not linear functions with respect to the average SNR in the log-scale; 4) By referring to [21] , the ASOP in the secure multi-relay system is analyzed, where three relay selection schemes are proposed. In the derived ASOP expression, the SDO and SAG are also presented, governing the SOP behavior in high SNRs; 5) The security-reliability tradeoff (SRT) proposed by [22] in the multi-relay system is also investigated when a constant code rate is adopted. Specifically, a fast calculation method for the code rate is provided based on the derived AOP expression, when the OP is given. We can use this derived code rate to calculate the corresponding intercept probability (IP), which is useful and important for the secure system design.
II. SINGLE DF RELAY MODEL
There is a source (S) transmitting confidential information to a destination (D) via a relay (R) forwarding the signal from S to D by using DF strategy in two time slots. Meanwhile, an eavesdropper (E) is trying to overhear the information from S to D. h ij (i, j ∈ {S, R, D, E}) is the channel gain of the i − j link. We assume that S-R, R-D, S-E and R-E links undergo independent GK fading, and E can receive signals of two time slots, while D has no direct link with S due to deep fading. E combines those two signals, and then selects the signal with higher instantaneous SNR, i.e., selection combining, 1 to cut down the signal processing complexity. Let P S , P R , and N 0 be the transmit power at S, transmit power at R, and power of Gaussian noise, respectively. The equivalent are SNRs of the first and second time slot, respectively.
The exact PDF and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γ t (t ∈ {r, d, e1, e2}) over GK fading channels can be written in the Meijer's G-function form as [13] ,
where k t , m t are distribution shaping parameters, γ t and Γ(·) denote the mean value of γ t and Gamma function [27] , respectively.
To avoid the Meijer's G-function in final expressions for SOP and ESC, 2 we can adopt the tight and tractably approximate PDF and CDF of γ t (t ∈ {r, d, e1, e2}) proposed by [16] , [17] 
1 The DF relay can use an independent codeword from that of the source such that the eavesdropper (even powerful eavesdropper) cannot employ maximal ratio combining [23] . 2 There is a strong debate about whether the Meijer's G-function can be considered as the closed-form or not [15] . 3 In this approximate PDF and CDF, mt and kt are only allowed to take positive integers.
respectively, where ς t,jt = ktmt
, L, ω jt and t jt are the number of summation terms, weight factor, and abscissas for the Gaussian-Laguerre integration, respectively. Further, from F γt (∞) = 1, we have
Thus, the CDF of γ t can be simplified as
where F γt (·) is the complementary CDF (CCDF) of γ t . By using the simplified CDF of γ t , the CDFs of γ D and γ E can be derived as
respectively. By differentiating the CDFs, the corresponding PDF of γ D is given by
and the PDF of γ E is shown in (10), at the top of the next page.
III. SOP ANALYSIS OF SINGLE DF RELAY MODEL
A. Exact Secrecy Outage Probability
In view of the Lemma 1 in [1] , the instantaneous secrecy capacity is defined as
where the source always adopts the maximum code rate according to the instantaneous channel states of the main channel, i.e., channel capacity. In this section, we assume that S does not know the channel state between S and E, i.e., silent eavesdropping scenario. In this case, S has no choice but to transmit signal at a constant rate of confidential information (R S ). When R S > C S , secure transmission cannot be guaranteed, and the corresponding occurrence probability is called SOP, i.e.,
where λ = 2 2RS . Lemma 1: The closed-form expression for SOP in a single DF relay system over GK fading channels is given by
where I 1 is defined as (13) , shown at the top of the next page, where 0 × (−1)! = 0 is defined. Proof: This SOP closed-form expression can be derived by substituting the CDF of γ D and PDF of γ E into the integral form of SOP, i.e., (11) .
B. Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Probability
As the derivation of ASOP involves the asymptotic CDF of γ D (i.e., AOP of the S − R − D link), we first investigate the AOP presented in Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 2: Given a message transmission of a point-topoint system over GK fading channels with m t and k t fading parameters, the asymptotic CDF (i.e., AOP) of the received SNR (γ t ) in high SNRs is 4
where γ t denotes the average of γ t , O t and Δ t are given by
and
where ψ(·) denotes the digamma function [27] , respectively. Proof: The exact CDF of γ t in (2) over GK channels is transferred into Taylor's series at γ t = ∞. When m t = k t , the Taylor's series of G 2,1 1,3
where o (·) denotes the higher order term. Thus, the asymptotic CDF of γ t for m t = k t in high SNRs is given by
which shows that the diversity order in the
. This Meijer's G-function can be truncated up to the m t -th order term after Taylor's expansion at γ t = ∞, 5 In this AOP analysis subsection, mt and kt can take any positive value, because this asymptotic result is derived from the exact CDF of γt.
According to the definition of diversity order, the diversity order in the m t = k t case can be derived as
Note that although the asymptotic CDF of γ t is not a linear function with respect to log γ t for m t = k t , the slope with respect to γ t changes very slowly in high values of γ t in the log-scale.
where v t = min{m t , k t }, and t ∈ {r, d}. Proof: When γ r = γ d = γ → ∞, by using the asymptotic CDF in (14) , the asymptotic CDF of γ D in high SNRs is
which can be further written as (22) by using the relationship between v d and v r . Proposition 4: When E wiretaps the confidential message of a S − R − D link by using selection combining strategy to combine two hops' signals over GK fading channels, the s-th (s = 0, 1, 2, · · · ) moment function of the combined SNR at
Proof: We first transfer the expression for the s-th moment of a non-negative random variable X in its CCDF form, i.e.,
where I{·} denotes the indicator function, i.e., I{A} = 1 for A true and I{A} = 0 otherwise. Then, by using the relationship between the moment function and CCDF of γ E , the s-th moment of γ E can be written as
Finally, the integrals in (26) can be solved in closed-form as (24) by using (3.326.2) in [27] . Lemma 5: For γ r = γ d = γ → ∞, the closed-form expression for ASOP of the investigated four-node system, i.e., S, R, D and E, is given by
where v t = min{m t , k t }, t ∈ {r, d}, and
where O te and Δ te are
respectively. The closed-form expression for E{γ s E } is shown in Proposition 4.
Proof: From (11) and Proposition 3, the ASOP can be written as in the integral form
It is obvious that SOP ∞ can be written as (27) . By using the asymptotic CDF of γ D derived in Proposition 3, SOP ∞ t can be rewritten as (32), shown at the top of the next page. For m t = k t , SOP ∞ t can be derived by 6
where E{γ s E } = 1 for s = 0. When m t = k t , SOP ∞ t becomes (34), shown at the top of the next page, where (a) follows
The reason of adopting approximation in (35) is that the exact term in (35) involves ln (λ − 1 + λx), resulting in the complexity of solving the integral in SOP ∞ t for m t = k t much more difficult compared to solving the exact SOP, which will lose the simplification purpose by doing asymptotic analysis.
(32)
By using the binomial expansion, the closed-form expression for
In view of the closed-form expressions for SOP ∞ t in m t = k t and m t = k t cases, SOP ∞ t can be derived in a unified form as (28) .
Observing Lemma 5, we can conclude that the SDO depends only on the link with lower diversity order, i.e., min{v d , v r } = min{m d , k d , m r , k r }. In the Nakagami-m fading channel (a special case of GK model with k r = k d → ∞), the impact of k d and k r vanishes, and the SDO is min{m r , m d }.
IV. ESC ANALYSIS OF SINGLE DF RELAY MODEL
A. Exact Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
In this section, we consider that S knows the channel state between S and E, i.e., active eavesdropping scenario, where S can adjust its instantaneous transmit rate such that the secrecy rate is C S to achieve perfect security. In this case, we are interested in the ESC. From [26] , we can derive the ESC in the integral form as
where
respectively. Note that (37) presents a general integral form for ESC over any fading channels.
To solve integrals more efficiently over GK fading channels, the integral identity derived in Appendix B of [28] 
where Γ(·, ·) denotes the complementary upper incomplete Gamma function. Lemma 6: The ESC of the single DF relay system over GK fading channels is C S = 1 2 C D − 1 2 C E , where C D and C E are given by (41) and (44), shown at the top of the next page, respectively.
Proof: By substituting the PDF of γ D and CDF of γ E into (38), C D can be derived as (41), where I 2 is given by (42), shown at the top of the next page. By using the integral identity (40), the closed-form expression for I 2 can be derived as (43), shown at the top of the next page.
Similar to the derivation of C D , by substituting the PDF of γ E and CCDF of γ D into the integral form of C E and using (40), the closed-form expression for C E is given by (44).
B. Asymptotic Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
Lemma 7: For γ r = γ d = γ → ∞, the ESC of this investigated single DF relay system is given by
where C ∞ E is given by (46), shown at the top of the next page, and Ω ∞ D is
(41)
in which
Proof: When γ r = γ d = γ → ∞, the AESC can be written as
where C ∞ D and C ∞ E are given by (49) and (50), shown at the top of the next page, respectively. The closed-form expression for C ∞ E can be obtained as (46) by using (3.353.5) in [27] . To simplify C ∞ D further, we adopt the following asymptotic results for the upper incomplete Gamma function as 
For p r = p d = 0, the asymptotic expression for the upper incomplete Gamma function is
Using the asymptotic results for the upper incomplete Gamma function and lim 
is the EC of eavesdropping links, which is improved by making γ e1 (or γ e2 , m e1 , m e2 , k e1 , k e2 ) larger, and thereby causing a worse ESC.
V. SYSTEM EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE RELAYS
In this section, the single relay system is extended to a multi-relay system, shown in Fig. 1 , where each relay among N relays (denoted by the set R) adopts the DF strategy to forward the signal from S to D. Assume that the channel gains of all S − R i links (i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}) follow the independent and identically distributed GK fading, and the same assumption is also used for the channel gains of R i − D and R i − E links, 7 denoted by the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) case in this paper. Moreover, the worst silence eavesdropping case is considered, i.e., existing a direct link between S and E. Based on these assumptions, the secure performance of three relay selection strategies is investigated in terms of SOP.
A. DF Based Optimal Relay Selection (DF-ORS)
As the CSI of wiretap channel is not available at S, the optimal relay selection is based on the CSI of S − R i − D links, denoted by DF-ORS. In the DF-ORS scheme, the best relay is selected according to [21] 
where γ si and γ id are the SNRs of S − R i and R i − D links, respectively. Let γ r , m r and k r (or γ d , m d and k d ) be the average SNR and GK fading parameters of all S − R i links (or R i − D links), respectively. The ASOP is given by Lemma 8. 
and the closed-form expression for the integral is
where M ∈ {v r N, v d N }, and E{γ M E } is given by (24) in Proposition 4.
Proof: Let γ i be the combined SNR of the S − R i − D link., i.e., γ i = min{γ si , γ id }. The asymptotic CDF of γ i is given by Proposition 3
where F ∞ γsi (·) and F ∞ γ id (·) are the asymptotic CDFs of γ si and γ id , respectively. Let γ D be the combined SNR under the DF-ORS scheme, and the asymptotic CDF of γ D can be written as
When k r = m r and k d = m d , the asymptotic CDF of γ D can be derived as
As the relay selection is according to the SNRs of S−R i −D links, the relay selection is random for E, and the CDF of the combined SNR at E (γ E ) in this case is the same as that in the single relay case, given by (8) (8) and (60) into the SOP definition, i.e., (11) , yields (56).
B. DF Based Sub-Optimal Relay Selection I (DF-SORSI)
Although the DF-ORS scheme is the best relay selection scheme for silent eavesdropping, the DF-ORS scheme involves the computation of two hops' channel capacity in the system. To cut down the computation complexity, the first sub-optimal relay selection scheme is proposed, denoted by DF-SORSI, which is only based on the first hop, i.e.,
SubOptimalRelayI = argmax
Ri∈R γ si .
(61)
Lemma 9: The ASOP of the secure multi-relay system investigated in Fig. 1 under the DF-SORSI scheme in the high SNR region of S − R i − D links (R i ∈ R) is given by
where the closed-form expression for the integral form is given by (57), in which M ∈ {v r N, v d }.
Proof: The asymptotic CDF of combined SNR (γ r ) in the first hop is
The asymptotic CDF of combined SNR (γ D ) in two hops at D is given by
where γ d denotes the received SNR of the second hop at D. Substituting the derived F ∞ γD (x) into (11) gives the ASOP as (62).
C. DF Based Sub-Optimal Relay Selection II (DF-SORSII)
The second sub-optimal relay selection scheme, denoted by DF-SORSII, is based on the second hop, i.e.,
SubOptimalRelayII = argmax
Ri∈R γ id .
(65)
Lemma 10: From the symmetrical property of two hops in the DF scheme, the ASOP under the DF-SORSII scheme can be easily derived according to Lemma 9, given by
where the integrals have been solved in (57). From Lemmas 8-10, it is obvious that the SDOs under DF-ORS, DF-SORSI and DF-SORSII schemes are min{v r , v d }N , min{v r N, v d } and min{v r , v d N }, respectively. It means that the SDO of DF-ORS scheme is always the largest one among the proposed three relay selection schemes. As described in Lemma 9, if v r N < v d , the SDO grows as N increases, while it remains constant (v d ) for v r N ≥ v d in the DF-SORSI case, which means that more relays cannot provide larger space diversity. This situation is reversed for the DF-SORSII scheme, shown in Lemma 10. For the DF-ORS scheme, the SDO always increases with increasing N .
VI. SECURITY-RELIABILITY TRADEOFF ANALYSIS
In the previous sections, the transmitter adopts the maximal code rate according to the CSI, i.e., channel capacity, for message transmission. In this section, the constant code rate at S is considered. In this case, there may exist an outage event for message transmission, because the channel capacity may not be always greater than the constant rate (R d ). By referring to [22] , the security-reliability tradeoff (SRT) is analyzed in this section.
As shown in Fig. 1 , S adopts a constant rate R d for message transmission to D via a relay selected among N relays. Let D be the subset of R where all relays in D can decode the signal from S successfully. There are 2 N possible subsets of R, denoted by ∅, D 1 , D 2 , · · · , D 2 N −1 , where ∅ represents the empty set.
If D = D n happens, the best relay selection is based on [22] OptimalRelay = arg max
where γ id is the SNR of R i − D link. The occurrence probability of D can be easily derived as
where δ = 2 2R d − 1, γ si , F · (·), F · (·) and D n denote the SNR of S − R i link, CDF, CCDF, and complementary set of D n in R, respectively.
A. Outage Probability Lemma 11: If a source adopts a fixed code rate (R d ) to communicate with a destination via N DF relays, where the relay selection is according to (67), the corresponding OP is
which is valid for general fading models.
Proof: The OP is given in the probability form as [22] P out = Pr {D = ∅} +
where C rd is the channel capacity between the selected relay and D, and Pr {C rd < R d } represents the OP of the second hop, given by
In view of (72), (68) and (69), the closed-form expression for OP is easily obtained as (70).
If S−R i links (or R i −D links or R i −E links) undergo i.i.d GK fading with fading parameters m r , k r , γ r (or m d , k d , γ d or m e2 , k e2 , γ e2 ), the OP can be simplified in a concise form, shown in Lemma 12.
Lemma 12: In the high SNR region of S − R i − D links, the OP of constant code rate in the secure multi-relay system can be approximated by
, and γ = γ d = γ r denotes the mean SNR of all S − R i − D links in two hops.
Proof: When γ r = γ d = γ → ∞ and m t = k t (t ∈ {r, d}), substituting the asymptotic CDF of γ t in Proposition 2 into the OP expression in Lemma 11 yields
where | · | denotes the cardinality of the inside set. By using the following equations
AOP can be further derived as
out can be finally written as (73) by using the relationship between v d and v r .
Corollary 13: If the OP (and γ) are sufficiently small (and large), δ can be approximately calculated by
where O t1 = Γ(|kt−mt|)(ktmt) v t Γ(kt)Γ(mt)vt , and t ∈ {r, d}. Proof: This corollary can be easily obtained by using Lemma 12.
After deriving δ by using Corollary 13, the corresponding code rate is easily obtained by R d = 1 2 log 2 (1 + δ). It is very useful and important for the secure system design, because if the OP is given, the approximate δ can be calculated immediately, which can be used to calculate the corresponding intercept probability (IP) given by lemma 14. Therefore, Corollary 13 bridges the OP and IP.
B. Intercept Probability
The IP, denoted by P int , is defined as the probability that the channel capacity of wiretap channel is greater than that of main channel.
Lemma 14:
The closed-form expression for IP in the i.i.d. case is
where F γe1 (·) and F γe2 (·) are the CDFs of the SNRs in the first and second hops of E, respectively.
Proof: In this constant rate scenario, P int can be written as [22] 
where C e1 and C e are the channel capacity of the first hop and combined channel capacity of two hops of E, respectively, Pr{C e1 > R d } and Pr{C e > R d } are given by
where C e2 is the channel capacity of the second hop of E, respectively. When γ r = γ d = γ → ∞, the asymptotic IP becomes
which shows that the impact of S − R i − D links vanishes, because when the SNRs of S − R i − D links are large sufficiently, there is always a relay selected among N relays to forward the signal from S to D. 
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. SOP in the Single Relay System
In this subsection, we run Monte-Carlo simulations to validate the correctness of the exact and asymptotic closed-form expressions for SOP, as well as the AOP for the S − R − D link.
As shown in Fig. 2 , we can see that the SOP is improved with γ d increasing, due to the improved second hop of the main channel. In the high γ d region, SOP is roughly unchanged because of the limit of the mean value of the first hop fading channel, i.e., γ r . It is also obvious that SOP becomes better as γ e1 and γ e2 decrease, and vice versa. We can also see that the SOP of k = 4 is much better than that of k = 2, because of lighter shadowing.
Figs. 3-4 plot OP of the S − R − D link derived in Proposition 3 versus γ with different m d and k d , where we can see that the OP is improved as γ increases, due to the improved average link between S and D. In Fig. 3 , the slope (reflecting the diversity order) of AOP depends only on the second hop for min{m d , k d } ≤ min{m r , k r }, and vice versa. Although the slope is determined by the first hop for min{m d , k d } ≥ min{m r , k r }, the intercept on horizontal axis (reflecting the array gain) decreases with m d increasing, resulting in the improved OP. Further, from Fig. 4 , we observe that the AOP is not a linear function with respect to γ for Fig. 6 . In Figs. 5-6, there is a decreasing trend of SOP for a larger m (or k), because of more multi-path (or lighter shadowing). It is also obvious that the SDO is min{m, k}, reflected in the different slopes. If m = k, the ASOP is not a linear function with respect to log γ, despite the slowly changing slope in the high SNR region in Fig. 6 . Fig. 7 plots ESC versus γ d , where ESC grows with γ d increasing in the low γ d region. When γ d is large sufficiently, the ESC will reach an upper bound with γ r fixed. Besides, when γ e1 and γ e2 increase, the ESC will be on decline, as the wiretap channel becomes better. It is worthwhile to note that in the high γ d region, the ESC of k = 6 is larger than that of k = 2 in the γ e1 = γ e2 = 1 dB case, while the figure for k = 2 is greater than that of k = 6 in another γ e1 = γ e2 case.
B. ESC in the Single Relay System
There is an increasing trend of AESC with k and m increasing in Figs. 8-9 , reflecting the decrease in the intercept on the horizontal axis (lower power offset). This is because a larger k (or m) represents lighter shadowing (or more multi-path in small scale fading). It is also easy to see that the slope of AESC is fixed ( 1 2 ) with respect to ln γ, regardless of any parameter setting.
C. ASOP in the Multi-Relay System
The secrecy outage performance of secure multiple relays under three selection strategies investigated in the V section is simulated in Figs. 10-11 . The SOP becomes larger as N decreases in Fig. 10 , which can be explained by the fact that a smaller N means less possible relay candidates in the selection stage (or smaller space diversity). The impact of N is also reflected in the slope of ASOP, where the line with a larger N has a larger SDO. The comparison of secrecy outage performance among three selection strategies is shown in Fig. 11 , where the SOP under the DF-ORS scheme is best, followed by the figures for DF-SORSII and DF-SORSI, respectively. As described in Lemmas 8-10, the SDOs of DF-ORS, DF-SORSI and DF-SORSII schemes are min{v d , v r }N , min{v r N, v d }, and min{v r , v d N }, respectively. This explains the reason that the line of DF-SORSI has the smallest SDO, and the slopes of DF-SORSI and DF-SORSII remain constant when N increases from 2 to 3. 
D. SRT Analysis in the Multi-Relay System
The OP of constant code rate at the source investigated in the VI section is presented in Fig. 12 . The impact of N on OP is based on the space diversity, i.e., more relays indicate larger space diversity, resulting in a better OP. This is also applied to the impact of N on IP in Fig. 13 . The solid lines in Fig. 13 are plotted by using the Corollary 13, i.e., the fast calculation of R d , when the OP is given. Fig. 13 shows a good matching between the approximate IP and exact IP, especially for small OP. Although the gap grows in the high OP region and a higher OP results in a better IP, a high OP (greater than 10 −3 ) means frequent outage in communications, which is unacceptable in the real communication systems.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the single relay case, we derived exact and asymptotic closed-form expressions for SOP and ESC. From the derived asymptotic expressions for SOP in high SNRs, we can see that the SDO is min{m d , k d , m r , k r } in the GK parameter setting, which is also valid for m d = k d (or m r = k r ) although the ASOP is not a linear function with respect to the average SNR in the log-scale. Our derived AESC expression shows that the slope of AESC is fixed for the changing average SNR in the dB scale. We have the similar conclusion for AOP and AEC in the investigated DF relay (S − R − D link). For the secure multi-relay system, the ASOP under DF-ORS, DF-SORSI and DF-SORSII schemes was investigated. The expression for ASOP shows the SDO and SAG, which governs the SOP behaviour in high SNRs. The SRT analysis was also presented when the source adopts a fixed code rate. Specifically, a fast calculation method for the code rate was developed based on the derived AOP expression.
